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Analysis and Commentary
I

The Art of Judgment:
An Organizational Analysis of the
New York City Fire Department,
September 11, 2001 (A Case Study)
A Paper Delivered at the Southwestern Political Science Association
Annual Meeting, Thursday, March 28, 2002, 8:30-9:45 a.m., The
Fairmont Hotel, New Orleans, Louisiana
Terence M Garrett

The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and the airliner
crash in Pennsylvania have placed immeasurable stress upon the victims, cleanup crews and the
American people. The grief and shock caused by the events will have lasting consequences.
Currently organizations are in a stage of reassessing their roles played before, during and after the
crisis in order to improve responses to any possible future tragedies. Additionally affected people in
organizations involved in the events are trying to overcome tremendous pain and a severe sense of loss
in moving beyond the attacks and its aftermath. The focus of this paper will be on the New York Fire
Department and the actions of its members in response to the attacks. Also considered are the
activities of the Oklahoma City Fire Department regarding their response to the bombing of the
Murrah Federal building. In particular, I will be examining specific incidents concerning judgments
exercised by executives and managers in the NYFD and OCFD. The two cases afford us the
opportunity to examine examples of judgments and decisions made by fire fighters on those two
fateful days.
The Shocks and Initial Responses of
September 11, 2001 and April 19, 1995
The crashing of the airliners into the World Trade Center buildings by the al Qaeda Network is the
worst act of terrorism perpetrated on the United States, surpassing the bombing of the Murrah Federal
Building in Oklahoma City by Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols in its scope and magnitude. The
World Trade Center towers withstood the airline impact but eventually succumbed to the fire created
by the massive amounts of jet fuel aboard the two aircraft (Glanz and Lipton 2002). McVeigh and
Nichols have been convicted of various federal counts regarding the Murrah Building bombing by the
use of a Ryder truck loaded with bombs made with diesel fuel and fertilizer. The events are similar,
however, in that the disasters were man-made and in their wake involved the coordination of
numerous government agencies in response to the tragedies. The initial reaction by fire fighters is
eerily similar, though the NYFD lost a considerable number of their own and this aspect has led to a
difficult time for the organization since the disaster. Additionally, the NYFD had significant problems
concerning radio communications and the horrific loss of men and f1re chiefs in the initial rescue
efforts. Regarding the September calamity, NYFD Captain Michael Donovan told interviewers that:
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It was a moment of disorienting shock. North seemed south. Left seemed right. The
simple act of drawing breath became a struggle, because the air was thick with dust and
black smoke from raging fires. Much of the senior command of the department, as well
as many colleagues, had disappeared, either beneath the debris from the World Trade
Center or in their own sprints to safety. And though the stillness was broken at times by
stray bullets exploding from the heat, there were very few cries for help. "It was like after
a bli2zard when there's nobody out and everything is very quiet and you can't really see,"
... "There was nobody. There was nobody. It was like Hiroshima after the bomb" (Flynn
and Dwyer 2002).
Donovan's comments were echoed by others, including the Deputy Assistant Fire Chief of Fire Safety,
Albert Turi, who came across the Brooklyn bridge in time to see the north tower collapse:
"I knew right from the start that there was no way this Fire Department could extinguish
six or eight floors of fire, fully involved, in a high-rise building," Chief Turi said. "It's
just not possible, because we don't have the means to do it."
Just entering the building bad lethal risks; the debris and bodies falling from the upper
floors were killing people on the ground (Dwyer 2002).
The chaotic conditions that the Oklahoma City Fire Department encountered are well described by
Assistant Fire Chief Jon Hansen:
Twenty-two years in the fire service will teach you to be ready for anything. But on
April 19, 1995, I learned there are some things you can never be completely ready to
filce. You can be prepared and that helps but you can never totally be ready for a
disaster of this magnitude .... No one waited for the alarm that we knew was coming.
Instinct kicked in immediately ... As my car topped Fifth and Walker, I was stunned to
see the chaos in front of me.... There was dense black smoke everywhere. A thick cloud
of brown dust hung in the air. Bricks and debris filled the street .... Dozens of dazed
people wandered the streets, many with blood streaming down their faces. People were
running-£nme running for help while others were running to help. Paper rained from
the skY (Hansen 1995, 7-9; Garrett 1996, 35). [Italics added for emphasis]
One can readily see the shocking situations faced by Captain Donovan, Chief Turi and Chief Hansen
in their attempts to manage the crisis events. The initial surprise of both infamous episodes brought
about similar circumstances in which managers and their workers had to deal with phenomena well
beyond the normal day-to-day activities. The terrorist attacks tested the organizations to their limits.
Subsequent to the events of the Oklahoma City case, the National Fire Protective Association (NFPA)
gave the OCFD generally high marks for the behavior of members of the organization, though there
were problems involving radio communications and some logistical failures (1995). The NFPA no
longer evaluates fire departments in the manner they did in 1995.1 A thorough comprehensive
analysis of the NYFD has yet to be completed. We will explore specific incidents in the two f'rre
organizations below and how they respond to internal political issues arising from the tragic events.
Organizational Conflict in the
New York Fire Department after September 11
An important aspect of healing is making an attempt to make some sense of what we (the public and
those people directly affected) can in understanding how we might improve our collective response to
terrorist attacks and other calamities. By nearly all accounts, the New York City fire and police
4
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department!; acquitted themselves well in saving the lives of many people, although there has been
some criticism as to what failures might be averted in the future in the event that some similar
catastrophe may occur. In this vein, the New York Fire Department, through Fire Commissioner
Nicholas Scoppetta, has undertaken an initiative to get private organizational consultants to analyze
how the NYFD responded to the events of September 11 and to do the job without pay (Lueck 2002).
Not all of members of the NYFD have the same desire and feelings concerning actions that might be
taken in order to come to a final conclusion regarding the department's response to events on
September I 1. This last point is illustrated by the following exchange between Commissioner
Scoppetta and Captain Peter Gorman, president of the Uniformed Fire Officers Association.
Commissioner Scoppetta wants to review the actions of the fire fighters on the fateful day in order to
correct or eliminate possible errors in the future. On this matter, the Commissioner stated "This isn't
about finding fault, it's about figuring out what happened and how best to prepare for a major
emergency in the future .... We want to give all this information to someone who will do a credible,
comprehensive review." Whereas, Captain Gorman indicated to reporters that ''the interviews [of the
firemen and chiefs] had initially been described [by the NYFD hierarchy] ... as historical
documentation" and t.hat "the fact they had become both public and a part of a normal investigation
amounted to a betrayal" (Flynn and Dwyer 2002). The exchange between the Commissioner and the
leader of the Uniformed Officers Association illustrates the tension that exists between executives and
managers in modern organizations. Executives (i.e., the Commissioner) live in a life-world with
different expectations and responsibilities. Managers (i.e., the Captain), who operate with different
assumptions in the organization, have to take orders from executives further away from the actual
work, in this case the search and rescue operation and clean-up of the World Trade Center area in the
aftermath of September 11, 200 I.
The existence of differences between levels in organizations is exacerbated during times of crisis or
when there are absolute and irreconcilable positions taken on a problem. This tension between the
executive and manager levels in an organization is characteristic of problems inherent in. the
knowledge analytic and is accentuated during times of stress in modern organizations (Carnevale and
Hummel 1996; Garrett 2001 ). The main problem for today's organizations is the ubiquity of hierarchy
as described below:
[TheJ turning of the head upward also makes me dependent not only of the superior
knowledge of technical task division and coordination possessed by my superior-it also
makes me dependent on that superior in a personal political way. If that superior
chooses to tell me to do things that express his or her personal self-interest rather than the
requirements for scientific task design or technical task coordination, / am no longer in a

position to know orjudge whether such demands are technical or political.

The potential for political misuse of technical working together on a job also means the
breaking apart of politically working together. Technically divided labor also surrenders
politicaljudgment... (Hummel 1994, 236).
The conflict depicted above regarding the different organizational interpretations of what ought to be
done regarding the investigation of the events of September 11 illustrate the political conflict inherent
to hierarchy. On the one hand there is the Commissioner attempting to get a report finding potential
culpability for (mis)management of organizational resources and apparently using surreptitious means
to obtain information. On the other hand, the Captain is suspicious of the motives of the
Commissioner regarding his intentions for the information obtained by interviewing fire chiefs and
their men done ostensibly for "historical documentation." The verdict is out as to which version is
true, but the conflict reveals the inherent problems found in modem organizations.
Public Voices Vol. VI Nos. 2-3
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Organizational Conflict and Resolution after April 19 2

The response by the Oklahoma City Fire Department, though positively evaluated by analysts and
critics, had a number of problems as part of its legacy. Critical here and somewhat analogous to the
NYFD issue involving trust between the executive, management, and worker levels, was the problem
of what to do with the fire fighters and officers on the scene who refused to obey organizational rules.
In particular, after the bomb had exploded at 9:02 a.m. and the various agencies began to arrive at the
scene of the disaster, a second bomb threat had been called in by what turned out to be a crank caller
at approximately I 0:00 the same morning. According to the rulebook, fire fighters are supposed to
leave their victims at the scene in order not to become casualties themselves. Several of the crews
decided not to leave and stayed behind to extricate the victims from the rubble of the Murrah building
and had disobeyed the rules. The dilemma for the organization was recounted below by Chief
Hansen:
The decision to pull out our people was made quickly. In truth, there was no choice to
make. The first rule for those responding to an emergency is not to become victims
themselves. However, getting everyone to comply was not as simple as giving the order
to vacate the premises. First, we had the logistical problem of getting word to rescue
workers .... We learned later that some of those rescuers opted to stay with the injured
and ride out the threat. We didn't reprimand any of them for their decision. We felt it
was one of those few times in life where there wasn't a right choice.... (Hansen 1995, 1819; Garrett 1996, 3 7).
We see here that when faced with the conflict between set organizational rules and the ethical/moral
dimensions of the managers and workers, common sense should prevail. The decision made by the
senior leadership of the Oklahoma City Fire Department not to use punitive measures for those fire
fighters who had violated the rules resulted in a reconsideration of organizational policies. Executives
and managers believed that nothing was to be gained by putting sanctions on the fire fighters who had
clearly done everything possible as human beings to do their work as best they could.3
A Brief Comparison of the Incidents Involving the Two Cases

The two cases illustrate well a common problem in modem organizations: who in the organization has
the best perspective as to how the agency should be run. In Western society, it is automatically
assumed that those at the top of the organization are best suited to perform this organizational role.
Due to the rigid nature of most human organizations the hierarchical model prevails. The language in
personnel manuals generally dictates specific prescriptions for members' organizational behavior.
Science is added to the cause of aiding management in conforming members into being systematic
machine-like tools. Executives and managers in modem organizations have a tendency to be rule
bound and favor improved scientific techniques for control. The philosopher Alfred Shutz warns of
the errors of applying what passes for science upon society:
.. . All social sciences are objective meaning-contexts of subjective meaning-contexts . ...
All scientific knowledge of the social world is indirect. It is knowledge of the world of
contemporaries and the world of predecessors, never of the world of immediate social
reality. Accordingly, the social sciences can understand man in his everyday social life
not as a living individual person with a unique consciousness, but only as a persqnal ideal
type without duration or spontaneity. They can understand him only as existing within an
impersonal and anonymous objective time which no one ever has, or ever can,
6
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exp¢rience. To this ideal type are assigned only such conscious experiences as are
required to accompany motives already formally postulated (Shutz 1967, 241).'
The danger of prescribing too much into the behavior of complex human beings cannot be
underestimated. Hummel, following the philosopher Edmund Husserl, states that "bureaucracy
models reality and becomes, in time, preoccupied with procedure" (1994, 213). Hummel further adds
that "true managers" really manage and behave with the best of intentions for their workers and the
public when they use their brains to deal with the non-routine (1994, 213).
Examining the two case studies, we can now see more clearly the problems in the organizations.
Judgments had to be made regarding the chaos that was created in the early stages of both disasters.
The fire chiefs and other fire fighters had to make decisions that involved the potential for losing lives,
including their own. This is nothing particularly unusual given the work that they do. However, in
both cases the calamities were unprecedented. All involved had to be Hummel's true managers in
dealing with matters that were definitely non-routine, and this aspect involves the application of
judgment. Sir Geoffrey Vickers' "appreciative systems" theory is instructive here though it is not to be
confused with technical-rational scientific theories (1995).5 Vickers' typology breaks judgment into
three primary areas: (I) Realityjudgments-based on what is and has been; (2) Value judgments-the
selection of the "facts" that are to be observed and regulated; and, (3) Instrumental judgments-or
"what are w' going to do?" (1995, 54, 103 and 114). We see from these two case studies variation in
all three subsets of Vickers' judgments. In the September 11 NYFD episode, questions as to what
occurred are accentuated between those who were actually there (the fire fighters and fire chiefs) and
the executives who were not directly involved in the event, such as Commissioner Scoppetta.
Explanations offered by the fire fighters were insufficient and outside organizational consultants have
been called for in order to get to the bottom of the perceived inadequate initial response. What "facts"
that are to be observed and regulated remain a mystery to Captain Gorman and the other uniformed
officers. The question persists as to what are the important facts that will be emphasized in an
organizational analysis after the events of September 11. This aspect has led Gorman and the other
officers in the NYFD to conclude that the upper reaches of the organizational hierarchy have ulterior
motives, especially after obtaining the stories and reports from the fire fighters. The instrumental
judgment aspect of "what are we going to do?" contributes to unease in the situation. Also, the
question remains as to whether specific organizational procedures were followed or violated and what
to do (if anything) following any final report given to the Commissioners by organizational
consultants. Hummel's criticism of bureaucracy manifests itself here as the dependency on the
superior (the Commissioner) leaves the Captain in the position to not know if he is to judge whether
the demands placed on him and his fellow officers in the NYFD are political or technical.
The OCFD handled the conflict between those who stayed with the victims during the second bomb
scare and those who left. Organizational rules had been violated, however, personal judgments were
made and the fire fighters who made them were not admonished by the upper management. There
was ultimately a consensus by all participants as to what occurred, although there was not total
agreement as to what the punishment ought to be. Using Vickers' appreciative systems we see that the
reality judgment and value judgment aspects were readily agreed upon intersubjectively by the fire
fighters, chiefs, and outside evaluators. The OCFD as a human system demonstrates that a consensus
is lacking in the instrumental judgment aspect. Some animosity exists in the organization and will for
as long as members hold to their personal judgments concerning the events of April 19, 1995.
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Conclusion

These two case studies demonstrate the importance of judgment on organizational decision-making.
Hummel (1991) has made the case that stories managers tell are as valid as science. We see in these
two cases the importance of judgments made by the fire fighters through their stories. A question
concerning trust remains as to how the NYFD Commissioner will use the internal interviews generated
by the organization. The NYFD officers have raised the issue and believe they have been betrayed.
The fact that there is internal political conflict within organizations is well known by any student or
practitioner in public administration. Crisis events such as those that occurred on September 11, 2001
and April I 9, 1995 well illustrate the tensions that are inherent to human organizations. Executives,
managers and other organizational participants render judgments. Whether those at the lower end of
the hierarchy are truly heard in the expression of their angst when problems arise is a key problem in
management. The application of science by the top of the hierarchy to lower-level participants can be
damaging to organizational members if applied without regard to circumstances surrounding social
reality.
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Endnotes
Previously I have conducted phone interviews and mail correspondence with Chief Fire Investigator Ed
Comeau after the Oklahoma City bombing. I have been told by the public infonnation office in Quincy,
Massachusetts that the NFPA was not going to analyze the NYFD in the aftermath of the events of September
11, 2001.
2
See Garrett 1996 for a more thorough explanation and elaboration of the activities of the Oklahoma City Fire
Department after the Murrah Federal Building bombing.
3 This is not to say that tensions have been completely resolved after this incident Conversations that 1 had with
a fire. engineer who worked closely with the OCFD during the disaster recovery phase indicated that there was
conflict within the organization after the decision not to punish those workers who stayed with the victims.
Those who left after the bomb scare and returned later believed they were right in following the rules and
resented the others who had stayed behind. Guilt from both groups is part of the traumatic legacy of dealing
with such a complicated and extraordinary incident.
4
Further elaboration is in order here. Science should not be completely pre-empted in all instances but should be considered
as one of several alternatives. A dynamic way to consider an element of the objective-subjective dimension of
philosophical! and scientific inquiry and to examine the temporal-spatial (natural world) is to use the "action
time" matrix developed by Bensman and Lilienfeld (1991 ):
1

Figure 1: Action - Time Matrix (From Bensman and Lilienfeld 1991, 25):

!ilm:

Action

Rationally
Calculated

Objective

Subjective

Scientific
Allitude

Planning
Attitude

Common
Sense
Rationality

Ritualistic and
Ceremonial
Action

Attitude of
Everyday life

Time and action are the crucial elements in our understanding of complex situations. Bensman and Lilienfeld
(1991, 16-7), following the philosopher Alfred Sbutz, demonstrate that scientific attitude and attitude of
everyday life represent different conceptions of time interpretation as "In the scientific attitude, time is
measured in the objective sense of the term with standardized units, independently of a feeling of involvement
[or rational detachment] which increases or decreases the experience of passing time." In the attitude of
everyday life, "actions are situationally egocentric in the same sense that psychological time is temporally
egocentric" (Bensman and Lilienfeld I 99 I, I 6). The planning attitude incorporates the scientific and natural
attitudes and reflects "an unselfconscious, nonreflective man who directly and immediately enters into social
relations with others in terms of his immediate personal goals and his direct and intuitive apprehension of a
situation'' (17). The ritualistic and ceremonial action cell "suggests ritual and ceremony as means of
organizing activity, especially in highly stylized or expressive ways (alternatives are not considered]" (18).
Time is important for our understanding of the context in which decision makers in these case studies took
action (made decisions) and under what conditions the decisions were made. The managers and workers of
the Oklahoma City and New York Fire Departments at the time immediately after the bombing were in the
"action" and "time" dimension of the "attitude of everyday life." Of course, when managers have the "time,"
they can, and often do, engage in strategic planning and trahting to attempt to cope with day-to-day actions.
They cannot, however, plan for every possible contingency, as these case studies illustrate. Rational science
has difficulty responding to the "altitude of everyday life" dimension when a crisis management situation
Public Voices Vol. VI Nos. 2-3
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occurs. But managers have to deal with these crises, nonetheless, rendering judgments on the scene within
limited time and space constraints.
s Vickers's (1995) appreciation systems approach pertains especially to judgment in decision making. Adams,
Catron and Cook (1995) note that
Many of the early systems theorists quickly became focused on the notion of a general systems
theory, which could apply equally to all forms of systems-natural, mechanical, and human. In
keeping with the modern epistemological dominance of technical rationality, such theories
were usually cast in terrns of those systems that could be most fully described and executed
technically. The concomitant developments in computers and artificial intelligence, along
with the emergence of sophisticated management information systems, further intensified this
bent in systems thinking. In many quarters, theorizing was reduced to technical modeling and
thus became increasingly inimical to the examination of processes such as human judgment,
which, due to their tacit elements, unfailingly resisted capture in wholly explicit and analytic
schemes (xviii).

Dr. Terence M. Garrett is a professor with the Political Science Department, University of Texas-Pan
American.

10

Public Voices Vol. VI Nos. 2-3

